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Peter Roberts

The Command and Control podcast breaks new ground in taking an independent and pragmatic look at what military command and control might look like for the fight tonight and the fight tomorrow. Join us as we talk through C2 for an era of high-end war fighting. The hypothesis is this: command is human, control has become more technological pronounced. As a result, the increasing availability of dynamic control measures is centralising control away from local command. It is a noticeable trend in Western C2 since the late 1980s. Over that time, blending human decision and cutting edge technology has been evolutionary but not deliberate: how will this change? Will it become dominated by a tendency to hoard power in those with the most computing power, might these factors serve to amplify the role of commanders? Given all the hyperbole about AI in C2 (and we will tackle some of that with AI experts), it's a conversation we need to have.

Command and Control

There is more useful knowledge on command from the ancients than we know what to do with. Dr Charles Vandepeer from Charles Sturt University in Australia poses a series of enduring questions that commanders continue to face, and sets up the question as to why the generals of Greece, Macedon, and Rome were successful – in peace and war. But this is not simply another anthology of great men: it poses the questions of 'how' rather than just being an appreciation. How to avoid over confidence and hubris? How do you exploit victory or recover from a defeat? How do you minimise surprise, shock, and fear? What can Alexander the Great, Ceasar and Hannibal teach us today? Indeed, should we be looking more towards Philopoemen rather than Aurelius?

Ancient Generalship

There is a tension between modern trend in centralising C2 (to govern the best use of resources) versus the now largely historical reliance on 'mission command'. Solutions are confounding Western commanders: according to Eva Sula there are additional dilemmas that are arising from the evolution of C2 in combat conditions – not least of which is how to import, verify, and use the vast data sets that each sovereign state holds (and is not releasing). The gap between political - and military – proclamations about co-operation, collaboration, and federation and the reality of sharing data, system information, and national controls is making the very idea of shared situational awareness less than feasible. The lessons from Ukraine (and from Russia) in evolving C2 systems are clear but it is also apparent that C2 will have to work outside areas of connectivity. Very large areas. And none of that is dealing with the absence of human agency in decision-making that US, Israeli, and Russian C2 systems have built in to the baseline operating systems. The tensions being exposed in C2 are now multi-faceted and appear to be growing. Many are appreciated, some ignored. It is, according to Eva, beyond the human comfort zone.

C2 Outside the Human Comfort Zone?

The US National Guard is closely tied to the C2 transformation programmes of the US Army; as their strategic and operational reserve there is no alternative. Yet the other missions of the National Guard - whether responses to pandemics, civil unrest, or natural disasters - have different priorities to meeting and destroying the enemy. Lt Gen (rtd) Jon Jensen, 22ndDirector of the National Guard, talks about those tensions, the ethos of mission and purpose, the funding for major change programmes, and how the US National Guard will adapt to the C2 challenges of the future. General Jensen's focus on people and process rather than technology and systems is refreshing and eye opening. The US National Guard will be challenged by the frictions in establishing a single C2 system that covers both the US Army National Guard (as part of the US Army) and the US Air National Guard (working under the USAF) but the legacy of Jon Jensen as Director should minimise tension and maximise effectiveness. Not a bad way to end 41 years of service.
 
Lt Gen Jon Jensen has recently retired after more than four decades of service, culminating in 28 months as the 22ndDirector of the Army National Guard, a job that guided the formation, development, and implementation of all programs and policies affecting nearly 335,0000 soldiers in 50 states, 3 territories, and the District of Columbia. Jon joined the Iowa state guard in 1982 as a combat medic and went on to become an NCO before becoming an officer. This was, of course, the Cold War and the last period of Great Power competition. Since then, Jon experienced the Guard through Counter Terror missions and Counter Insurgency during the Global War of Terror, as well as the domestic demands of pandemic, civil unrest, and natural disasters. Before his role as Director, Jon served as the 31st Adjutant General of Minnesota and earlier, as Commanding General of the Minnesota National Guard's 34th Infantry Division. He also was dual-hatted as Deputy Commander and Army Reserve Component Integration Adviser, U.S. Army Africa and Southern European Task Force, U.S. Africa Command. He has commanded at the company, battalion, brigade and division levels. His operational assignments include operations DESERT SPRING in Kuwait, JOINT FORGE in Bosnia Herzegovina in SFOR14, and IRAQI FREEDOM, twice.
 
The Disclaimer: Views expressed here do not represent those of the US National Guard, the US Department of Defense/Department of War, or any other institution.

The Future of US National Guard C2

No commander would deny that military actions are governed by both behaviours, policy and law yet there is considerably more emphasis placed in rules of engagement, release criteria, and national interpretations of self defence in the training and education of military officers than in the legal principles that sits behind them. Those principles were created by fighters who had experienced the cauldon of combat across the millenia and determined that there were some basic ideas about the conduct of war, the treatment of prisoners and civilians that needed to be codified. Whether the Code of Hummurari in 1750BCE, how guidance was drawn from the Book of Deuteronomy, the ethics of the 7th Century caliph of Abu Bakr, or the writings of Augustine of Hippo, the laws of war have a rather significant history associated to them.
 
Today, governed still by international law above all else, commanders cannot get away from the complexities of the law on operations and - with increasing scrutiny on military action after the fact – the role of the legal advisor in a headquarters has rarely been more important. But the LEGAD occupies an unusual and difficult position: holding the moral, ethical, and legal boundaries in focus in the midst of hard – perhaps even existential - fighting requires tenacity, honesty, and considerable courage.
 
Brigadier Lisa Ferris, currently the New Zealand Defence Force's attache to the UK and previously head of the NZDF legal servcies team, explains more.

C2 and Lawfare

Battlefield medicine is as much an enabler and force multiplier as good logistics. Whilst this is acknowledged by many, including those in the US Army, there is a peculiar absence of consideration for Battlefield Health in selection and development of its new command and control system. Major General (retired) Edward Dorman, a proven combat leader and master logistician, digs into what is needed for medical C2 as an operational consideration in the future, about which lessons are relevant from both US experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and from partners experiences in Ukraine and wider contemporary conflict. Structured data alone is not the answer, neither is agentic AI, Large Language Models, or boutique systems. The conversation has a realism about Battlefield Medicine and Healthcare that has been absent for too long.

The Future of US Battlefield Medicine

The US Navy is undergoing some seismic changes in terms of C2. Not only is the concept of how they fight changing (from Fleet command to fight from the MOC), but also in changing the supporting system (GCCS-M). In understanding these changes, who is going what, when, and why, Peter is joined by David Gast, formerly head of PMW150 to outline the good, the bad, and the difficult; but most importantly to try and allow us to understand what this will feel like for the sailor (or staff officer) in 3 or 5 years' time.
 
The Guest: Captain (retired) David Gast was commissioned as a Surface Warfare Officer in 1996, serving in cruisers and destroyers before a lateral shift into the Engineering community. David's subsequent service saw him deeply involved in C2, C4I, and integration and interoperability programmes at the NRO, NAVWAR (or SPAWAR as it was then), and DCGS-N. He was the Combat Systems Officer in USS NIMITZ for her 2016-2017 workup and deployment before becoming Deputy Program Manager for the US Navy's C2 Program Office (known as PMW150); he subsequently became Programme Manager there. David's final tour in the USN was as Director of Innovation for the Program Executive Office for C4I, and military lead for C4I effects. Recently retired, David is now the Founder and Principal of DWG Agile Innovations LLC, an advisory, consulting and coaching firm.
 
The Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are those of Mr David Gast and do not represent those of the US Navy or the US Department of Defense.

The Future of US Navy C2

President Eisenhower was notable in expressing his frustration at his civilian staff's unwillingness to challenge or disagree with him face to face. That practice, of being challenged and questioned, was something he valued when he served as Supreme Allied Commander but it seems less evident in military headquarters today, or in recent history. Nor is this a peculiarly American tendency: as researcher, author, and provocateur Dr Charles Vandepeer from Charles Sturt University points out, both the British, French, and Australian militaries have been prone to self-deception and optimism bias. Notable in acquisition and procurement decisions and behaviours, it is also present in military headquarters and by commanders. There is lots of evidence and research on how to overcome it yet using trite phrases such as "My door is always open" just won't cut it if leaders are serious about countering conspiracies of optimism that lead to operational failure. In order to confront reality, military leaders need to change their outlook and find more time for thinking. This might seem harder today than previously: in the age of real time chat, ubiquitous communications connectivity, and endless distractions, it is easier for leaders to doomscroll their way through command appointments than to make time and space for challenge, reality, and thinking.
 
This conversation came about because of this article from War On The Rocks from 2019: https://warontherocks.com/self-deception-and-the-conspiracy-of-optimism/
 
In his remarks, Charles noted the remarks made by Major General Chris Smith of the Australian Army in 2025 at the Chief of Army History Conference . Watch here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mv6wQiUu4yo

Conspiracies of Optimism

A fresh mini-series on command and control that looks at the future of C2 for each of the US fighting arms. This episodes kicks off the deep dive with a look at what the US Army is aiming to achieve.
 
Recently retired Vice Chief of Staff US Army, General (rtd) James Mingus talks about the US Army's philosophy for command and control, next generation C2, how allies and partners can get on board, and the opportunities that arise from the US Army's top modernisation priority for industry as well as soldiers.
 
General James Mingus has recently retired as Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army. No one gets four stars without qualifying in just about every way possible – and Jim Mingus is no exception. Starting in the US National Guard in 1981, he commissioned in 1985. Originally a Second Lieutenant in the field artillery, he switch to the infantry in 1987 on becoming active duty. Serving in Germany with 3rdInfantry Division, later in the 82nd Airborne at Fort Bragg, and after that in 75th Ranger Regiment. A tour at JSOC, command of a Ranger Regiment, and command of a BCT from 4th Infantry Division including a combat tour in Afghanistan were just some of the highlights. Indeed, Jim deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan a total of 12 times in his career. In 2013 he ran the Commanders Action Group at CENTCOM before returning to 4 Infantry Division as Depuy Commanding General for Manoeuvre. Service at the Pentagon and on the Joint Staff rounded out his career before becoming Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army in 2023. There are few people better equipped to talk about the US Army's command and control, and their ambition for the future.
 
Disclaimer: All remarks and comments made by General Mingus are his own views and do not represent the US military, US Joint Staff, Pentagon, Departments of Defence, War, or those of the US Army.

The Future of US Army C2

Ten Baltic and Scandinavian (and the UK) have agreed to come together to form a multi-national maritime force for crisis response around Northern Europe, specifically on the maritime border with Russia. All parties are NATO members, and members of the Joint Expeditionary Force – itself a NATO framework organisation. Ed Arnold from the D Group explains why this is about operationalising the JEF when the politics of it is wandering. But the credibility of the UK is being pressed hard when command commitments are growing, diverse, geographically spread, and rely on too few qualified and experienced people. Why should the UK command? Why should others follow? Why is Northwood the right place? And, how will the UK balance the long-standing habit of using US C2 systems with an announcement that declares an intent to command on whatever system European Allies favour? Ed Arnold answers all these questions and queries. Underlying the discussion sits some uncomfortable concerns about UK command credibility, the need for continued momentum if the Northern Navies Initiative is to survive, and the desperate need for some form of political prioritisation of tasks from London.

C2 and the Northern Navies Initiative

There is a tendency (particularly in militaries) to view machines as less fallible than humans. The rapid and passionate adoption and use of AI tools in military headquarters is a notable manifestation of machine/automation bias: to operate at machine speed is viewed by many in uniform as the panacea and—according to doctrine—offers those with it a preordained right to victory. The critical lessons identified in the IDF use of 'Lavender' and 'Where's Daddy?' in Gaza from 2024, and apparently now built into the US military's MAVEN tool, have been ignored. According to Dr Elke Scharwz, militaries really need to start understanding and embracing human agency in decision-making: something that was present for millennia but is now actively being forgotten as AI tools and systems replace people. The lack of friction, debate, argument, dissension, and human discussion over targets and targeting should concern us all. As humans feel increasingly inferior to the AI tools they create, the old idea of Promethean Shame raises its head again: Elke advocates taking back control of technology instead of simply adapting ourselves to it. Per Christopher Coker "We must choose our tools carefully, not because they are inhumane (all weapons are) but because the more we come to rely on them, the more they shape our view of the world". Warrior Geeks (Hurst, 2013).

Promethean Shame

The captain of a warship has, sometimes, godlike omnipotence. Does this mean that naval command and control has some unique characteristics that need to be better understood in order to be integrated into the 'modern' rubric? Vice Admiral Martin Connell, Second Sea Lord in the British Royal Navy, talks to Peter about what's unique about naval C2, and whether the education and development of leaders in the Royal Navy is good enough.

Naval C2

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