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Peter Roberts

The Command and Control podcast breaks new ground in taking an independent and pragmatic look at what military command and control might look like for the fight tonight and the fight tomorrow. Join us as we talk through C2 for an era of high-end war fighting. The hypothesis is this: command is human, control has become more technological pronounced. As a result, the increasing availability of dynamic control measures is centralising control away from local command. It is a noticeable trend in Western C2 since the late 1980s. Over that time, blending human decision and cutting edge technology has been evolutionary but not deliberate: how will this change? Will it become dominated by a tendency to hoard power in those with the most computing power, might these factors serve to amplify the role of commanders? Given all the hyperbole about AI in C2 (and we will tackle some of that with AI experts), it's a conversation we need to have.

Command and Control

If Europeans have been swiftly divesting themselves of real amphibious capability, the reverse has been true of the ADF in recent years. Ray Leggatt, the first true Commander Amphibious Task Force of the Australian Amphibious Force, talked through his experience in putting together an amphib capability for a state that had not done this sort of operation in a couple of generations. Ray provides a remarkably honest and frank set of assessments about the capability when he was CATF, the essential trust and relationship needed with the Commander Landing Force (CLF), and the realities of doctrine versus practicality necessary to make a nascent capability tangible.

Amphibious Complexity: C2 in the AAF

Most people in the C2 world who would acknowledge the Goldwater Nichols reforms of the US military as one of the big muscle movements in command and control over the last 75 years. It provided the framework for how the US would run wars after 1986 and has had mixed success. But in organising the world of conflict along geographic lines, in prioritising the fights of today over preparing for the conflicts of tomorrow, and in – perhaps – ceding strategy to the military, there is a growing urgency in the need to rethink this structure and some of the organisational principles that US C2 is founded on. Eliot Cohen, doyen of US strategy and history, shares his views on why the reforms of 1986 came about and where the system needs amending.

Goldwater Nichols: Still fit for purpose?

It is the responsibility of the Corps level of command to set the conditions for a favourable and unfair fight at the tactical level: so says Major General Mike Keating, Chief of Staff at Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. The scale, complexity, and enduring nature of combat on land requires a structure that can enable divisions to fight and prevail, enabling subordinate formations to focus on the immediate and near term with the resources necessary to succeed: recognition of that has seen a renaissance in the Corps level in NATO, and more widely. HQ ARRC was deployed and employed in Afghanistan during the COIN era, but the skills and functions were different; political, and immediate. Today, the Corps has changed. Mike explains how – and what the future holds for the highest level of tactical command and control.

The Unfair Fight (HQ Corps job)

C2 systems litter headquarters – some have coalesced into a single machine, others spread across various apps, platforms, and systems. It’s a growing market place and one that can genuinely bamboozle with all the unmoderated lingo that goes with it. Claims that AI, ML, edge, and clould are scattered with wild abandon but lack some of the detail that HQ staff and commanders actually need. And there is something about contemporary combat and warfare here too. The need to rapidly scale access to systems in Ukraine could be equally matched by lessons from Sudan, Yemen or Kashmir. HADR missions work better with C2 systems that have this ability to size up swiftly – as well as working cross multiple domains, actors and security classifications; the requirement to meet the need of NGOs and multiple coalition partners (civil as well as military) is a demand matched in its complexity only by the demands for data and analytics from every level.
 
To give us some truth rather than wild claims and rhetoric about C2 systems, I asked the show’s sponsor – Systematic – for a brief. Step forward Global VP for BD, Andrew Graham and his team: data scientists and military veterans from around the world, all with a distinct passion for C2.

Reality checking industry offerings for C2

Western militaries won’t be able to do C2 in urban warfare scenarios well enough to prevail. So says Professor John Spencer, author, researcher, commentator and veteran of numerous campaigns. Recent lessons from urban fights demand that HQ staffs refocus on things they can control and need to influence (the Info Ops battle, allocation of scarce resources like engineers, as well as critical CIMIC, legal, PAO issues), whilst combat leaders on the ground will need to understand – and exploit – legacy equipment and tools that find utility in complex urban battles; think sound powered telephones, or procedural and paper Fire Support Co-ordination Measures (FSCMs). John’s advice is to train hard, understand the terrain, and what you – and your enemy – is capable of in this unique environment.

C2 for Urban Warfare

Sometimes insubordination within the command chain actually works. Want an example? Take the infamous 1973 Yom Kippur War, when the divisional commander of a reserve formation (Ariel Sharon) circumvented not just his superiors but also the IDF chief in order to get approval for his plan. Gross insubordination….but it worked. History favours Sharon’s own narrative but the command chain had a different perspective. Personalities matter in C2: sometimes the clash of commanders can be detrimental to the campaign. Sometimes insubordination is necessary, but you won’t end up as Prime Minister every time. Nate Jennings explains the context of the fight, the decisions, and the background to the big decisions.

Insubordination

Peace keeping missions (whether peace enforcement, peace building, peace making, or conflict prevention) are very different to the formatted hierarchy and organisation of set-piece, large-scale military missions which Western allies have been accustomed to over the past decade. Even the experiences of ISAF or Iraq are outliers rather than a standardised format replicable across peace keeping tasks. This is also evident in the C2 of these missions: often more complex, ambiguous, woolly, and confusing than most military officers will be accustomed to. And that’s without bringing in a strategic HQ structure that has fewer staff and less experience than Western counterparts. Ewan Lawson, associate fellow at RUSI, talks through what characterises PK missions: his one-word answer? Fragmentation.

C2 and Peacekeeping

The key principles of logistics might not have changed (Jomini’s principles remain as valid as ever), but we have been lulled into false sense of adequacy about logistics and war. Steve Leonard and Jon Klug delve into how protracted wars make command conversations about logistics and supply different. The honest advice from the G4 might not always be appreciated but husbanding resources for a long-war is something commanders need to hear, and probably don’t get from elsewhere. War-gaming might help but when these exercises are limited by time and training outcomes, the realities and tensions of logistics are less about the last mile and more about an ability to adapt, innovate and invent.
 
Steve and Jon’s new book, ‘Professionals talk Logistics’, is available from Howgate Publishing now.

Professionals Talk Logistics

The announcement in February 2025 of a restructuring of Ukrainian command and control went largely unnoticed in the West. It shouldn’t have: the implications are significant. Mick Ryan provides some much-needed illumination and insight into what this means, why it came about, some of the challenges and opportunities that may result, and whether lessons are immediately transferrable. Training and selecting commanders is a critical enabler to making this all work, and Mick recalls some of the syllabus from his time at the USMC School of Advanced Warfighting to give us a flavour of how different the Corps level is from Brigade operations. Mick finishes with a short update on IDF C2 as a comparator.
 
As well as Mick’s 3 books currently available, he also has a chapter in Steve Leonard and Jon Klug’s new book, “Professionals Talk Logistics”, available from Howgate Publishing. You can also sign up for Mick’s substack so you don’t have to miss out on his weekly Big 5.

Ukrainian C2: Adaptation under fire

Everyone understands that civil agencies and institutions do not operate in the same way as military organisations. The culture, aims, objectives, and funding models are different, as is the way they run activity. So when militaries and these agencies interact, a sense of friction and misunderstanding often emerges. A small group of military staff stand between the behemoths of civil and military leaders – the CIMIC staff; it is their understanding of both sets of cultures that smooths activity in the 97% of military activity that is not combat operations. Kathleen Porath, academic advisor at the NATO CIMIC COE, talks about areas for improvement, the impact of technology, and the investments needed to improve relationships for the future.

CIMIC and C2

The captain of a warship has, sometimes, godlike omnipotence. Does this mean that naval command and control has some unique characteristics that need to be better understood in order to be integrated into the ‘modern’ rubric? Vice Admiral Martin Connell, Second Sea Lord in the British Royal Navy, talks to Peter about what’s unique about naval C2, and whether the education and development of leaders in the Royal Navy is good enough.

Naval C2

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