Strategic Studies Institute

Colin S. Gray

This monograph examines the potential utility of history as a source of education and possible guidance for the U.S. Army. The author considers the worth in the claim that since history (more accurately termed the past) is all done and gone, it can have no value for today as we try to look forward. This point of view did not find much favor here. The monograph argues that although history does not repeat itself in detail, it certainly does so roughly in parallel circumstances. Of course, much detail differs from one historical case to another, but nonetheless, there are commonly broad and possibly instructive parallels that can be drawn from virtually every period of history, concerning most circumstances.
Contents:
Should the U.S. Army Learn From History?
Understanding the Past: A Foreign Country?
Persisting Concerns and Enduring Hazards
A Familiar Past? Parallels and Analogies
What Changes and What Does Not?
What Can the U.S. Army Learn From History?
Recommendations for the U.S. Army

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