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Peter Roberts

The Command and Control podcast breaks new ground in taking an independent and pragmatic look at what military command and control might look like for the fight tonight and the fight tomorrow. Join us as we talk through C2 for an era of high-end war fighting. The hypothesis is this: command is human, control has become more technological pronounced. As a result, the increasing availability of dynamic control measures is centralising control away from local command. It is a noticeable trend in Western C2 since the late 1980s. Over that time, blending human decision and cutting edge technology has been evolutionary but not deliberate: how will this change? Will it become dominated by a tendency to hoard power in those with the most computing power, might these factors serve to amplify the role of commanders? Given all the hyperbole about AI in C2 (and we will tackle some of that with AI experts), it's a conversation we need to have.

Command and Control

The rise of Agentic agents in military headquarters is a foregone conclusion. Understanding how they perform, where they may hallucinate answers, and their requirement for credible and reliable data sets sit at the heart of their utility. Henrik Sommer, a retired Brigadier General with the Danish military, explains some of the potential, vulnerabilities, weaknesses, and opportunities that AI can provide, including from Systematic's new Wingman AI tool, something already embedded in the Sitaware system. The importance of coders, teachers and trainers of algorithms, and how we prompt AI come out as clear markers in this conversation, as does the core question: how much should we trust AI in the military?

AI and Wingman

Russia has become adept at directing the attention of its adversaries by triggering national security responses to small, sometimes insignificant activities, distracting Western leaders from Moscow's more important actions elsewhere. The Kremlin understand Western sociology and politics so well that one is hard pressed to do anything but admire their execution of reflexive control over external national security systems: The Wests' inability to regain the initiative and to build a more resilient attention economy is disappointing. Dr Ivana Stradner has some answers: in explaining the foundations of Russian C2, Ivana offers real options for Western leaders in regaining a footing in the information war against Moscow.

Russian Reflexive Control

In 2019, the Dutch municipality of Lochem was hit with a major cyber-attack that impacted everything from welfare payments to the sewage system. The mayor at the time – Sebastiaan van T' Evre – considered that the entire IT system had corrupted including backups. Starting from scratch, and with the help of suppliers and partners, Lochem rebuilt the bare bones within 24 hours. As a journey in civil C2, Sebastiaan recounts his experiences, his decisions, the frustrations, and his objectives during and after the attack, as well as some lessons for the future.

A city paralysed by cyber-attack: Civil C2 made real

It is rare to find anyone who has been actively engaged in C2 over a 20 year time span, let alone 40. For nearly half a century Michael Holm has been making C2 systems for the military. In that time he has witnessed the change in demands, data, systems, requirements, and opportunities. Michael brings an interesting perspective: as someone who has not served in the military - but has been dealing with them every day - he is able to outline the continuities and shifts in what the military thinks about C2, the systems it wants to use, and how the relationship with industry has changed. 
 
This is a long epiosde - no apologies for that. If you are genuinely interested in how C2 has evolved and changed for Western militaries since the arrival of computers there are few better places to start than this conversation; recorded in Michael's rather swish HQ in Denmark.

C2 - the long view (with Michael Holm)

If the role of the Corps level is in setting the conditions for Divisions to win, how are Divisions and subordinate commands going to conduct their own battle (and command it)? What are their roles in the tactical battle? Where does the line get drawn between levels? Is it doctrinally fixed or dynamic? Modern divisions don't fight like those in WW2, nor as we planned to during the Cold War, certainly not in the same way as they did in Afghanistan and Iraq. This isn't about simply faster Combined Arms warfare: For all the talk about Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in the US Army – and those equivalents elsewhere in Western militaries – trying to understand the US Army concept for operations during their "Continuous Transformation" isn't easy. Step forward Colonel Ethan Diven, Provost of the US Army University and Commandant of the Command and General Staff Course to explain what this might look like, how commanders and their staff will need to prepare, and what US PME is doing about the new challenges facing the military leaders at the tactical level today, and for tomorrow.

Manoeuvre and the network: C2 at XXX and Below

If Europeans have been swiftly divesting themselves of real amphibious capability, the reverse has been true of the ADF in recent years. Ray Leggatt, the first true Commander Amphibious Task Force of the Australian Amphibious Force, talked through his experience in putting together an amphib capability for a state that had not done this sort of operation in a couple of generations. Ray provides a remarkably honest and frank set of assessments about the capability when he was CATF, the essential trust and relationship needed with the Commander Landing Force (CLF), and the realities of doctrine versus practicality necessary to make a nascent capability tangible.

Amphibious Complexity: C2 in the AAF

Most people in the C2 world who would acknowledge the Goldwater Nichols reforms of the US military as one of the big muscle movements in command and control over the last 75 years. It provided the framework for how the US would run wars after 1986 and has had mixed success. But in organising the world of conflict along geographic lines, in prioritising the fights of today over preparing for the conflicts of tomorrow, and in – perhaps – ceding strategy to the military, there is a growing urgency in the need to rethink this structure and some of the organisational principles that US C2 is founded on. Eliot Cohen, doyen of US strategy and history, shares his views on why the reforms of 1986 came about and where the system needs amending.

Goldwater Nichols: Still fit for purpose?

It is the responsibility of the Corps level of command to set the conditions for a favourable and unfair fight at the tactical level: so says Major General Mike Keating, Chief of Staff at Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. The scale, complexity, and enduring nature of combat on land requires a structure that can enable divisions to fight and prevail, enabling subordinate formations to focus on the immediate and near term with the resources necessary to succeed: recognition of that has seen a renaissance in the Corps level in NATO, and more widely. HQ ARRC was deployed and employed in Afghanistan during the COIN era, but the skills and functions were different; political, and immediate. Today, the Corps has changed. Mike explains how – and what the future holds for the highest level of tactical command and control.

The Unfair Fight (HQ Corps job)

C2 systems litter headquarters – some have coalesced into a single machine, others spread across various apps, platforms, and systems. It's a growing market place and one that can genuinely bamboozle with all the unmoderated lingo that goes with it. Claims that AI, ML, edge, and clould are scattered with wild abandon but lack some of the detail that HQ staff and commanders actually need. And there is something about contemporary combat and warfare here too. The need to rapidly scale access to systems in Ukraine could be equally matched by lessons from Sudan, Yemen or Kashmir. HADR missions work better with C2 systems that have this ability to size up swiftly – as well as working cross multiple domains, actors and security classifications; the requirement to meet the need of NGOs and multiple coalition partners (civil as well as military) is a demand matched in its complexity only by the demands for data and analytics from every level.
 
To give us some truth rather than wild claims and rhetoric about C2 systems, I asked the show's sponsor – Systematic – for a brief. Step forward Global VP for BD, Andrew Graham and his team: data scientists and military veterans from around the world, all with a distinct passion for C2.

Reality checking industry offerings for C2

Western militaries won't be able to do C2 in urban warfare scenarios well enough to prevail. So says Professor John Spencer, author, researcher, commentator and veteran of numerous campaigns. Recent lessons from urban fights demand that HQ staffs refocus on things they can control and need to influence (the Info Ops battle, allocation of scarce resources like engineers, as well as critical CIMIC, legal, PAO issues), whilst combat leaders on the ground will need to understand – and exploit – legacy equipment and tools that find utility in complex urban battles; think sound powered telephones, or procedural and paper Fire Support Co-ordination Measures (FSCMs). John's advice is to train hard, understand the terrain, and what you – and your enemy – is capable of in this unique environment.

C2 for Urban Warfare

In 'How to Win' rather than 'How to Operate' in a peer or near peer war, time is vital and the ability to share commands (orders) faster than an adversary becomes a critical function of campaigning. The ability to plan and create those orders rapidly enables a different operating tempo to be achieved, ensuring dissemination works to outpace opponents. Peter talks to Lt Gen (rtd) Ben Hodges, US Army, about the differences between historical C2, the contemporary fight, and the future of C2. A new orders process able to be worked and distributed across coalitions and alliances seems to be a fundamental part of success: underpinned by complex exercises, skilled use of common language, and a shared understanding of what needs to be done. In essence, we need to focus more on a 'common tactical mindset' than a 'common operating picture'.

A New Orders Process

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